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One-Bank Holding Companies: The Case Against
a Legislative Roadblock
"That is to fear which has the power to harm."
-DANTE, THE INFERNO
Holding companies controlling a single bank have existed in the
United States for nearly a century.' Until recently, such holding com-
panies primarily controlled only the smaller banks2 and were generally
organized either to provide banking services for the employees of large
nonbanking corporations3 or to provide banking services in small rural
communities. 4
Beginning in 1968, however, a significant number 5 of the country's
large commercial6 banks began to organize their own one-bank hold-
ing companies.7 These holding companies are the product of a form
1 The earliest one-bank holding company in this country appears to have been formed
not later than 1880 with the establishment of the Amoskeag National Bank of Man-
chester, New Hampshire, as a subsidiary of the Amoskeag Savings Bank. See STAFF OF
HousE Comm. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., THE GROWTr OF UN-
REG IsTERED BANK HOLDING COMPANIES-PROBLFMS AND PROSPECTS 294 (Comm. Print 1969)
[hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
2 Id. at 6.
3 Hearings on H.R. 2674 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th
Cong., Ist Sess. 569 (1955). A typical example is that of the 3M Company's construction
of the Eastern Heights State Bank in 1959 in order to provide banking services for its
employees in a rural part of St. Paul, Minnesota. Hearings on S. 2353, S. 2418, and Hr.
7371 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1, 409 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings].
4 In smaller communities a family or a group of a few business associates might own
several of the local business establishments including a bank. The various firms would
typically be owned by a single corporation which facilitates transfer of ownership and
the raising of capital. See 1966 Hearings, supra note 3, at 119-20, 139-41.
5 By the beginning of 1969, 34 of the 100 largest commercial banks in the United
States had either formed or announced their intention of forming one-bank holding
companies. These banks hold deposits of over $100 billion, about 25% of all commercial
bank deposits in this country. STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-7.
6 A commercial bank's distinguishing characteristic is that it may provide checking
accounts (demand deposits) for its customers, a service which may not lawfully be per-
formed by such closely related financial institutions as savings and loan associations and
mutual savings banks. In this article, the term "bank" always refers to commercial banks
unless the context indicates otherwise.
7 In addition to bank-organized holding companies, it is possible for a nonbanking
conglomerate to form a one-bank holding company through the acquisition of a single
bank. Between Sept. I and Dec. 31, 1968, sixteen nonbank corporations each announced
its intention of purchasing a bank and thereby becoming a one-bank holding company.
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of corporate legerdemain in which each bank eventually becomes a
subsidiary of a corporation created by the bank to effect the reorgani-
zation.8
As long as the holding company retains control of only a single
bank,9 it is free to acquire an almost unlimited variety of subsid-
iaries.10 This ability to engage in nonbanking businesses and to escape
from the myriad of regulations to which banks are subject" has
prompted the introduction in the current session of Congress of a num-
ber of bills, having as their common denominator the imposition of
restraints upon the activities of one-bank holding companies.' 2
STAF REpORT, supra note 1, at 48. Most of the factors considered by this comment apply
both to bank-originated and nonbank-originated one-bank holding companies. Where
differences might be present, they are noted.
8 Alternative techniques are available for accomplishing the reorganization. One
method is to exchange the bank's stock on a share-for-share basis for stock in the hold-
ing company. An alternative technique is the "phantom bank" method, so named because
the holding company first becomes the owner of a newly chartered but commercially
inactive (i.e., a "phantom') bank and then merges the old bank into the new one. The
second method is essentially a force-out merger which effectively eliminates any dissenting
shareholders. See Shapiro, The One-Bank Holding Company Movement: An Overview,
86 BANKING L.J. 291, 296-7 (1969).
9 Bank holding companies controlling two or more banks are subject to the provisions
of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-9 (Supp. IV, 1969), amending
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-8 (1964). This Act is administered by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve Board, 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (1964), and in general prohibits a multi-bank
holding company from acquiring more than a de minimus interest in nonbanking corpora-
tions, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5) (Supp. IV, 1969), except those which are "of a financial,
fiduciary, or insurance nature and which the Board... has determined to be so closely
related to the business of banking" as not to be subject to the prohibitions of the Act.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. IV, 1969).
10 The only exception, but an important one, is that the holding company could not
directly or indirectly engage "in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or dis-
tribution" of securities. See 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of June 16,
1933, ch. 89, § 20, 49 Stat. 704, 707), one of the many banking statutes engendered by the
Great Depression.
31 See generally Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System (pts. 1 & 2), 52 VA. L. REv. 565,
771 (1966).
12 H.R. 946, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 6778, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R.
9385, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 12,130, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); and S. 1664, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The House bills have been the subject of hearings held by the
House Committee on Banking and Currency. All of the proposals perform two tasks:
(1) placing one-bank holding companies under the supervision of some federal adminis-
trative agency and (2) prohibiting one-bank holding companies from engaging in non-
banking businesses either directly or through subsidiaries, except under certain limited
conditions. The bills are not in agreement with respect to which agency should supervise
one-bank holding companies; some opt for the Federal Reserve Board of Governors alone,
others prefer a system involving the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in addition to the Federal Reserve Board. Nor
is there agreement with respect to the exceptions to the "nonbanking business" prohibi-
tion; some favor a specified list of exemptions while others recommend broad guidelines
to be interpreted by the appropriate federal regulatory agency. A detailed examination
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This comment advances the thesis that one-bank holding companies
provide a method for improving economic efficiency in allocating
resources and are therefore economically desirable. The arguments
which have been put forth by those who seek to restrain the activities
of one-bank holding companies are examined and found to be without
substantial merit. A number of potential problems that could develop
from the one-bank holding company structure are discussed; methods
of dealing with them under existing laws are considered; and sugges-
tions are made for legislative revision where such revision appears
necessary.
I. BANK HOLDING CoMPANIEs: THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE
Several reasons have been offered to explain the current popularity
among the banking community of one-bank holding companies.'3 An
illustrative list would include (1) the ability of the one-bank holding
company to diversify into nonbanking activities thought to yield
higher profits than otherwise attainable by banks; 14 (2) the ability of
the bank holding company to achieve greater flexibility in its capital
structure through the issuance of a larger proportion of debt instru-
ments than could be achieved under the existing climate of bank regu-
lations; 15 and (3) the ability to attract and retain talented personnel
by offering remuneration in excess of that offered by a bank's typically
low salary structure without the necessity to upgrade the salary scale
of those employed by the bank.16
Explanation is not, however, justification. Consequently the critical
question remains: Are there any benefits which the commonweal might
derive by permitting the formation and unregulated operation of
one-bank holding companies? To answer this question requires an
examination of the role of banks in the economy.
The primary 7 function of commercial banks has been to act as
financial intermediaries, receiving funds from those economic units
of the provisions of these bills is beyond the scope of this comment which takes the posi-
tion that legislation of this type is both unwarranted and unwise.
13 A nonbanking corporation which becomes a one-bank holding company is presum-
ably motivated by the belief that the acquisition of the bank will be a profitable invest-
ment because of the bank's own ability to produce net income, perhaps enhanced by
better management supplied by the acquiring firm.
14 See The One-Bank Holding Company: Threat or Threshold?, 78 FORTUNE 55 (Nov.
1968).
15 Nadler, The One-Bank Holding Company, 61 BANKING 34, 35 (Dec. 1968).
16 Id. at 34.
17 Commercial banks provide a variety of money-oriented services such as the rental
of safe-deposit boxes, the administration of decedents' estates, and trust fund manage-
ment. P. TRmscorr, FINANCING AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 14 (1963).
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having a surplus of assets and channelling them to those economic
units having a deficit of assets.18 The channelling process takes the
form almost exclusively of credit extensions rather than direct invest-
ment because of the legislative restrictions imposed upon banks. Na-
tional banks, for example, generally may not invest in the stock of
other corporations, 9 nor may their purchases of investment securities
(defined as bonds, debentures, and other debt instruments) from any
one obligor or maker exceed 10 per cent of their unimpaired capital
and surplus.20 Furthermore, national banks and their subsidiaries21
must confine themselves to the "business of banking, '22 although the
line separating banking from nonbanking activities is quite hazy.23
Banks which arguably cross the line may find themselves in the thicket
of civil litigation brought by groups seeking to protect their compet-
itive position from encroachment by the banks.24
Imposing such barriers to entry into nonbanking activities and forc-
ing banks to employ credit extensions instead of direct investment may
be economically inefficient for three reasons. First, the lending process
may impose transaction costs upon the system of capital allocation
that would not be incurred under a process of direct investment. For
example, lending requires a complex collection system to insure the
return of borrowed funds.
Secondly, existing restrictions frustrate efforts to achieve economies
of scale which might be brought about if various services were pro-
vided by a central source. For example, a bank's data processing and
credit information reporting facilities might serve a number of firms
at lower cost than would result if each firm had to supply its own
facilities.25 Thus, a one-bank holding company which owned both
18 Gurley & Shaw, Financial Intermediaries and the Saving-Investment Process, 11 J.
FiNANcE 257, 259 (1956).
19 12 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh (Supp. IV, 1969).
20 Id.
21 National banks are permitted to have subsidiaries provided that the subsidiaries
engage only in those activities in which the banks themselves may engage. CoMPTROLLM.r's
MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS 7376 (1966, Supp. 1969).
22 12 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh (Supp. IV, 1969).
23 See Beatty, What are the Legal Limits to the Expansion of National Services?,
86 BANKING LJ. 3 (1969). See also Harfield, Sermon on Genesis 17:20; Exodus 1:10, 85
BANKING J. 565 (1968).
24 See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 279 F. Supp.
675 (D. Minn. 1968), af'd, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 395 U.S. 976
(1969) (data processing services); Arnold Tours v. Camp, 286 F. Supp. 770 (D. Mass. 1968),
af'd, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 2589 (U.S. May 19,
1969) (No. 1407) (travel agency). See generally Note, Diversification by National Banks, 21
STAN. L. REv. 650 (1969).
25 Some evidence of an increase in efficiency may be inferred from the efforts of existing
data processing concerns to keep banks from offering such services to their customers.
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insurance and automobile sales subsidiaries might be able to offer2 6 to
a potential automobile purchaser a package consisting of the auto-
mobile, a loan to finance it, creditor life insurance, and liability-colli-
sion insurance. The cost for this package might be lower than the cost
of the individual components because the holding company could
avail itself of a single customer application processed centrally to as-
certain whether the potential purchaser was a good credit risk and a
good insurance risk. Furthermore, the transactions among the various
holding company subsidiaries might operate more smoothly than would
be the case if each subsidiary were an independent firm.
A third source of improved economic efficiency could come from
the utilization of the managerial talents of bankers to replace less
skilled managers in other firms who may be operating their businesses
less efficiently than is possible. A bank may have developed a large
and talented staff to service customers in a particular line of com-
merce,2 7 and this expertise might lead to improved efficiency if it were
employed directly in the management of a particular firm.
A one-bank holding company can achieve these efficiencies because
its investment policies are not governed by banking regulation. As in-
dicated earlier,2 the one-bank holding company is free to invest its as-
sets directly into almost any business it desires. Those holding compa-
nies organized by banks can be expected to obtain their operating
revenue at least initially from their subsidiary bank. Although it is
possible that such funds could flow from the bank to the holding com-
pany by way of extensions of credit, this is not very likely to occur to
any significant extent for reasons discussed in the next section.29 More
likely, the funds will come from the bank's earned surplus account
and from its annual net earnings distributed to the holding company
as the bank's sole shareholder.
Such efforts have met with mixed judicial results. In Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969), supra note 24, the plaintiffs, a
trade organization, were held to lack standing to litigate the legality of the Comptroller's
ruling permitting national banks to provide data processing services upon request to
their customers. But see Wingate Corp. v. Industrial Natl Bank, 288 F. Supp. 49 (D.R.I.
1968), vacated and remanded, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), in which the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, relying upon the Bank Service Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861-5
(1964), held that a competitor did have standing to litigate the issue. In neither case was
a decision on the merits reached.
26 The holding company could not insist that the consumer accept the entire package,
for such insistence would constitute an unlawful tie-in arrangement. See text at notes
88-92 infra.
27 Whitesell, Economics of the One-Bank Holding Company, 152 BANKas MAGAZINE 28,
30 (Winter 1969).
28 See text at notes 9 & 10 supra.
29 See section II infra.
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If the bank is going to fund the holding company primarily through
distribution of earnings (past and present), it is reasonable to ask why
the holding company is necessary since the same earnings distribution
could be made to the bank's existing shareholders without forming
and operating a holding company. The shareholders in turn would
then be free to invest in any area they desired since they are not re-
stricted by banking regulations.
The above conclusion is susceptible to three objections. First, it is
not likely that a bank would distribute a substantial part of its earn-
ings to shareholders. If the bank retains its earnings, it may use them
as reserves"° for expanding the bank's lending capacity and hence its
profit-producing capacity. A distribution of earnings, on the other
hand, has the effect of limiting the bank's lending capacity.31
Secondly, it would seem that there is a loss of efficiency in distrib-
uting earnings to shareholders because of the higher transaction costs
involved. With the holding company in existence the bank need only
make a transfer of funds to a single entity as compared with a distribu-
tion to numerous shareholders. Furthermore, when the shareholders
do receive their share of distributed earnings they face the problem of
seeking out profitable investment opportunities, and they may be
forced to pay broker's fees or to add additional sums of their own
money to what would probably be a rather small amount received
in the distribution of the bank's earnings before any investment would
be reasonably practical.
The final reason why a distribution of bank earnings to its share-
holders is not likely to produce the same economic results as a distribu-
tion to its parent holding company is that once the funds leave the
bank's control, there is no assurance that any of the economies of scale
or utilization of bank managerial talent discussed earlier 32 would be
achieved. In fact, it is virtually certain that such results could not be
achieved without the holding company structure because the bank
would continue to be prohibited from entering nonbanking areas.
The potential for increased economic efficiency in resource alloca-
tion serves to justify the creation of one-bank holding companies un-
30 Commercial banks operate on a fractional reserve system since they are required to
maintain as reserves only a fraction of their deposit liabilities. Thus, if the reserve
requirement was 20% for demand deposits, a single dollar of reserves would provide a
basis for extending up to $5 in loans by crediting the borrower's checking account.
31 A shareholder is likely to remain indifferent regardless of whether the bank dis-
tributes or retains its earnings as long as the increase in the bank's stock value caused by
retaining the earnings is approximately equal to the rate of return which the shareholder
could obtain by taking his part of the bank's earnings and investing it elsewhere.
32 See text at notes 25-27 supra.
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less, of course, there exist countervailing reasons for precluding the
holding company's ability to invest directly in and thereby to enter
nonbanking businesses. The next three sections consider the principal
arguments which have been advanced in support of the proposition
that one-bank holding companies should not be free to enter nonbank-
ing businesses.
II. BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND DEPOSITOR SAFETY
The funds which banks utilize for their lending operations come
for the most part from time and demand deposits.33 Time deposits (e.g.,
savings accounts) are maintained in banks as opposed to competing
financial institutions34 because of the bank's ability to offer a combina-
tion of safety, convenience, and liquidity in addition to the payment
of interest.3 5 Demand deposits (checking accounts), on the other hand,
provide a useful medium of exchange36 and are maintained in banks
because no other institutions may lawfully provide checking account
services. 37
Persons placing funds in time and demand deposits do not believe
that they are making an investment with risk of loss. 38 If banks were to
act imprudently with these funds, the resulting loss of depositor con-
fidence might prompt a withdrawal of such funds from the banking
system with a concomitant contraction of the money supply.3 9 Maximi-
zation of the safety of depositors' funds is thus a matter of public
importance.
Opponents of one-bank holding companies have traditionally as-
serted that permitting the bank holding companies to enter non-
banking areas would endanger the safety of depositors' funds by tempt-
ing the banks which are affiliated with the holding companies to
make improvident loans. According to this view, the temptation
33 As of June 30, 1968, demand and time deposits represented 86.5% of the combined
capital-liabilities accounts of commercial banks. In dollar figures this represents approxi-
mately $400 billion. P. HORviTz, MONETARY PoucY AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 46 (2d ed.
1969).
34 Commercial banks face competition for time deposits from a number of sources
including mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions. Kreps,
Characteristics of Local Banking Competition, in BANKING AND MONETARY STuDIEs 319, 321
(D. Carson ed. 1963).
35 P. TRnscorr, FINANCING AmRICAN ENTERPRISE 235 (1963).
36 Note, Bank Charter, Branching, Holding Company and Merger Laws: Competition
Frustrated, 71 YALE L.J. 502, 505 (1962).
37 United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326 (1962).
38 Note, supra note 36, at 506.
39 See generally M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHwARTz, THE GREAT CONTRACTION: 1929-1933
(1965).
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would arise from two sources. First, banks might make loans to their
nonbanking affiliates (including the parent holding company) even
though such loans would not be justified under existing banking stand-
ards.40 Second, banks might extend credit to customers of their non-
banking affiliates even though the credit standards would indicate
that such loans should not be made.41 In either case, it is alleged, the
safety of depositors' funds would be seriously impaired.
Historical evidence fails to offer any support for such fears. During
the spring of 1966, congressional hearings were held on various pro-
posed amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,42 in-
cluding one that would have forced one-bank holding companies to
divest themselves of their nonbanking affiliates. Approximately 550
one-bank holding companies were then in existence. 43 One of the
groups favoring the adoption of the amendment was the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.44 The Board was forced to
admit, however, that it did not "have evidence of abuses of rela-
tionship between one-bank holding companies and their affiliates." 45
In the end, the proposed amendment was rejected because "there was
no substantial evidence of abuses occurring in one-bank holding com-
panies." 46
There are several reasons why one-bank holding companies are
likely to continue to maintain an unblemished record. First, bankers
work in glass offices; that is, the affairs of virtually all banks are open
to continual investigation and examination by one or more of the
federal bank regulatory agencies. 47 These agencies have the power to
supervise closely the day-to-day operations of banks.48 With respect
to a national bank, investigation and examination extends to its affili-
ates49 to the extent "necessary to disclose fully the relations between
40 H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1955).
41 Statement by William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of
Representatives, April 18, 1969, reported in 55 FEn. Rrs. BuT.. 331, 332 (1969).
42 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-9 (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-8 (1964).
43 STAF REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
44 1966 Hearings, supra note 3, at 58-59.
45 Id. at 70.
46 S. RP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
47 See 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1964) (national banks subject to examination by Comptroller of
Currency); 12 U.S.C. § 483 (1964) (Federal Reserve member banks subject to examination
by Federal Reserve System); 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b) (Supp. IV, 1969) (any bank insured by
FDIC subject to examination by FDIC).
48 1 K.C. Dxvis, ADmmisRATmvE LAw TpEATiSE § 4.04, at 247 (1958).
49 A one-bank holding company and its nonbank subsidiaries would be considered
affiliates of a national bank. See 12 U.S.C. § 221 (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 12 U.S.C.
§ 221 (1961), the relevant part of which is set out at notes 60 and 61, infra.
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such banks and such affiliates and the effect of such relations upon the
affairs of such bank." 50 Furthermore, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) may inspect any insured bank at any time to de-
termine whether it is engaged in "unsafe or unsound practices."'51 If
such practices are detected, it may terminate the bank's insured status52
thereby throwing a national bank into receivership.53
Extensions of bank credit are given special attention by the Fed-
eral Reserve System. Each reserve bank is required to "keep itself
informed of the general character and amount of the loans and invest-
ments of its member banks with a view to ascertaining whether undue
use is being made of bank credit for . . . [any] purpose inconsistent
with the maintenance of sound credit conditions."5 4 Improvident ex-
tensions of credit, if detected, can result in suspension of the offending
bank from the Federal Reserve System.55
Banks are also limited in the nature and amount of credit which
they can extend to their affiliates and investments which they can
make therein. In general, no bank which is a member of the Federal
Reserve System or which is insured by the FDIC may
(1) make any loan or an extension of credit to, or purchase
securities under repurchase agreement from, any of its affil-
iates, or (2) invest any of its funds in the capital stock, bonds,
debentures, or other such obligations of any such affiliate, or
(3) accept any capital stock, bonds, debentures, or other such
obligations of any such affiliate as collateral security for ad-
vances made to any person, partnership, association, or cor-
poration, if, in the case of any such affiliate, the aggregate
amount of such loans, extensions of credit, repurchase agree-
ments, investments, and advances against such collateral secu-
rity will exceed 10 per centum of the capital stock and sur-
plus of such ... bank, or if, in the case of all such affiliates,
the aggregate amount of such loans, extensions of credit, re-
purchase agreements, investments, and advances against such
collateral security will exceed 20 per centum of the capital
stock and surplus of such .. . bank.56
The term "extension(s) of credit" includes "the discount of promissory
notes, bills of exchange, conditional sales contracts, or similar paper."57
50 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1964).
51 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
52 Id.
53 12 US.C. § 1818(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
54 12 U.S.C. § 301 (1964).
55 Id.
56 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1964).
57 12 U.S.C. § 871c (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1964).
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Within the above limitations, "each loan or extension of credit of
any kind or character to an affiliate shall be secured by collateral in
the form of stocks, bonds, debentures, or other such obligations,"58 and
the value of such collateral must equal at least 120 per cent of the loan
or other extension of credit unless the collateral consists of govern-
ment obligations, in which case the collateral must have a value of 110
per cent of the loan or extension of credit.59
A one-bank holding company would be an "affiliate" of its own
bank subsidiary60 as would each of the other subsidiaries of the holding
company.6' To a great extent, then, cross-dealings between the bank
and its holding company or other subsidiaries of the holding company
are effectively restricted under existing law both quantitatively and in
terms of collateral requirements.
The statutory provisions discussed above were not drafted as tightly
as they might have been; consequently, a bank-holding company deter-
mined to circumvent their spirit while obeying their language can do
so in three ways. First, the 120 per cent collateral provision can be
effectively ignored if the collateral consists of the stocks, bonds, or de-
bentures of the holding company itself. If the holding company or its
subsidiaries are not able to repay their loan to the bank, then it is
not very likely that their equity or debt instruments will be valuable
to the bank for the purpose of securing the loan.
This loophole can be plugged by employing the rule of statutory
construction that asserts that statutes will not be construed to make
them absurd. In this case, it is absurd to permit the holding company's
own stocks or bonds to serve as collateral for a loan since such col-
lateral would surely be no more valuable than the holding company's
promise to repay the loan.
The second technique which permits the holding company to cir-
cumvent the statute's salutary provisions involves a fairly simple
scheme. The holding company first invests a large sum of money, say
$10 million, in the bank-subsidiary and receives in return a special
class of stock, say class S (for sneaky). The bank has $10 million extra
58 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1964).
591 Id.
60 "[A]ny corporation . . . (4) Which owns or controls, directly or indirectly, either a
majority of the shares of capital stock of a ...bank or more than 50 per centum of
the number of shares voted for the election of directors of a .. . bank at the preceding
election" is defined as an affiliate by 12 U.S.C. § 221a(4) (Supp. IV, 1969).
61 "[A]ny corporation ... (2) Of which control is held, directly or indirectly, through
stock ownership or in any other manner, by the shareholders of a . ..bank who own
or control either a majority of the shares of such bank or more than 50 per centum
of the number of shares voted for the election of directors of such bank at the pre-
ceding election" is defined as an affiliate by 12 U.S.C. § 221a(2) (1964).
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in its capital accounts and so may lend up to 20 per cent (*2 million)
to the holding company and its subsidiaries without offending the
statutory restrictions. After the loans have been made, the bank re-
deems the special class of stock, thereby returning the $10 million to
the holding company.
This loophole is only serious if the collateral for the bank's loan is
not worth the amount loaned. Furthermore, it would not be stretching
the language of the statute too much to prohibit the bank from engag-
ing in any transaction with its holding company or other affiliates that
would result in the 20 per cent loan limit being exceeded.
The third method of circumventing the statutory limits on ex-
tensions of credit to bank affiliates is brought about by the ability
of national banks to engage in equipment leasing, 62 whereby the bank
purchases equipment on its own account and then leases it to some
other firm, in this case to one of its affiliates. Such a lease is in sub-
stance nothing more than a security device with the equipment as the
collateral. The lease form is used to take advantage of tax savings
that may be possible. 63
Support for the proposition that this type of equipment leasing
is merely a disguised security transaction is derived from section
1-201(37) of article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 64 There are
a few reported cases in which leases were held to be security devices.6 5
If such a leasing arrangement by a bank is construed as a security
device for an extension of credit, then the transaction fairly easily fits
into the scheme of restrictions imposed upon bank-affiliate transactions.
Apart from the statutory restrictions, there are other reasons why
banks are not likely to engage in conduct which would endanger
their depositors' funds. Bank directors are personally liable for any loss
resulting from their participation or acquiescence in any violation of
62 The Comptroller's Manual for National Banks provides that "a national bank may
become the owner or lessor of personal property acquired upon the specific request and
for the use of a customer and may incur such additional obligations as may be incident
to becoming an owner and lessor of such property." CoMMvaoLEa's MANUAL FOR NATIONAL
BANKS 3400 (1966).
63 See Riordan & Duffy, Lease Financing, 24 Bus. LAw. 763 (1969).
64 "Unless a lease . . is intended as security, reservation of title thereunder is not a
security interest' . . . . Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by
the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of
itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon com-
pliance with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become
the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration
does make the lease one intended for security." UNIFORM COMMRCLiAL CODE § 1-201(37)
(1962 version).
65 See, e.g., In re Pomona Valley Inn, 4 UCC RFP. SERV. 893 (D.C.C.D. Cal. 1967); In
re Transcontinental Industries, Inc., 3 UCC REP. SEav. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
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the above limitations on dealings among bank affiliates. 66 Furthermore,
directors are personally liable at common law for failure to use ordi-
nary care in the supervision of a bank's affairs, 67 and such liability can-
not be avoided by delegating responsibility to the bank's officers. 6
Another reason why banks are not likely to make improvident loans
is that if a loan is not repaid because of the insolvency of the borrower,
the lending institution's profits are reduced. Since banks are profit-
oriented like any other firm, it would be irrational for them to extend
credit to anyone who is not likely to repay the loan.69 This principle
applies regardless of whether the borrower is one of the bank's affiliates
or a customer of one of the affiliates.
Another factor that should not be ignored in assessing the probability
that one-bank holding companies will foster abusive banking practices
is that of public confidence in a particular bank as opposed to banks
in general. To survive, a bank must be able to attract and maintain
deposits, thereby permitting it to engage in profitable credit transac-
tions. Because of the competitive environment in which banks exist,70
any given bank which deviates too far from what the public considers
to be acceptable banking standards is likely to find itself without de-
positors or with a very substantial decline in the level of its deposits.
Thus, the same profit motive which might tempt a bank to engage in
questionable conduct also serves to countervail this temptation. This
countervailing force should exist regardless of whether the bank hold-
ing company is dominated by bankers or by the managers of a nonbank
conglomerate.
Should a bank act unwisely, the existence of federal deposit insur-
ance shifts most of the risk of loss away from depositors who are subject
to only a temporary inconvenience.7 1 If the existence of nonbanking
affiliates is thought to pose greater dangers to depositor safety, perhaps
the best solution would be to grant to the FDIC the power to assess
insurance contributions on the basis of a bank's involvement in such
nonbanking activities.7 2
As indicated earlier,7 3 it is most unlikely that the bank will fund
66 See 12 U.S.C. § 501a (1964).
67 Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1938) (directors liable for negligently
permitting loans to exceed statutory limitation for single borrower).
68 Bowerman v. Hammer, 350 U.S. 504 (1919).
69 Cf. Note, Bank Charter, Branching, Holding Company and Merger Laws: Competi-
tion Frustrated, 71 YALE L.J. 502, 508 (1962).
70 See note 34 supra.
'71 Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HAav.
L. RFv. 1207, 1234 (1969).
72 The assessment rate for FDIC insurance is currently uniform. 12 US.C. § 1817(b)
(1964).
73 See text at notes 25-27 supra.
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its holding company by lending its depositors' funds for the reasons
which have been considered in this section. The most likely source of
funds is the bank's earned surplus account. Will the use of earnings
and earned surplus have an adverse effect on depositor safety? Not
significantly. Existing law requires that a national bank maintain a
certain minimum capitalization 74 in order to provide a cushion for
depositors, should a portion of a bank's loans become uncollectable or
its securities decline in value.7 5 However, for more than 50 years, cap-
ital as a percentage of bank assets has steadily declined;76 and no ob-
jections appear to have been raised, probably because the existence of
federal deposit insurance fills the void left by the declining capital
accounts. As long as banks maintain the minimum capitalization
required by law, depositors are subjected to no greater risk than that
prescribed by Congress.
III. CAN BANK HOLDING COMPANIES BE TRUSTED
NOT TO VIOLATE THE ANTITRUST LAwS?
Apart from the issue of depositor safety, opponents of one-bank
holding companies allege that two forms of anticompetitive behavior
are likely to arise if banks are permitted to enter nonbanking busi-
nesses. First, a bank might refuse to extend credit to a firm which
competes with or is about to compete with one of the bank's own affil-
iates.7 7 Secondly, a bank might refuse to extend credit to a firm unless
the firm agreed to purchase goods or services from the bank's affiliates. 7
8
In both cases, the restrictions on competition would occur in the pro-
duct markets served by the affiliates of the bank, although the precise
effects upon competition would be dependent to some extent on the
number of firms present in the relevant market.
Both of these patterns of behavior may exist in analogous situations
even without the presence of a one-bank holding company. For ex-
ample, a bank which has extended credit to one business establishment
may refuse to extend credit to a competing business for fear that the
competition might endanger the ability of one or both of the firms to
74 National banks must maintain a minimum of from $50,000 to $200,000 in capital
depending upon the population of the community in which they are located. 12 U.S.C.
§ 51 (1964). In addition, a national bank must build up a surplus at least equal to its
required minimum capitalization before it may distribute earnings to its shareholders.
12 U.S.C. § 60(a) (1964).
75 P. Hoavrrz, MONrTARY POLICY AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 48 (2d ed. 1969).
76 Id.
77 See 1966 Hearings, supra note 3, at 71.
78 See Hearings on S. 76 and S. 1118 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 24 (1953).
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repay their loans. 0 Similarly, a bank may refuse to extend credit to a
firm unless the firm agrees to use some other bank product such as
a lock-box service. There is thus nothing peculiar in the holding com-
pany structure as far as the creation of the possibility for such be-
havior is concerned.
It does not, however, appear very likely that a bank would possess
the economic power necessary to engage in such anticompetitive con-
duct. If such conduct is to be at all effective, it must be assumed that
the firms seeking bank credit have no alternative sources for obtaining
funds. At the very least this means that no other bank in the area
would be willing to extend credit to such firms and that the firms
themselves would be unable to raise funds by selling securities to the
investing public. The recent upsurge in the formation of one-bank
holding companies is taking place in the major metropolitan areass0
where alternative sources of financing are likely to be available. Con-
siderable doubt is thus cast upon the premise which underlies this
proposition.
Even greater doubt is cast upon the validity of the proposition by
the fact that those who advocate it take an inconsistent approach to the
problems ostensibly generated by one-bank holding companies. This
inconsistency is well illustrated by one of the current legislative pro-
posals sl designed to restrict the activities of one-bank holding compa-
nies. This bill would permit a bank holding company to acquire only
those subsidiaries which are "financial or related to finance in nature
or of a fiduciary or insurance nature."8' 2 Such a provision would make
little sense if the anticompetitive behavior argument were meant to be
taken seriously, for such behavior is just as likely to be present with
respect to "financial" subsidiaries as it is with respect to nonfinancial
ones. The other legislative proposals for restricting one-bank holding
company activity also contain similar provisions.8 3
If the banks and their holding companies were to engage in these
forms of anticompetitive behavior, they would be inviting antitrust
litigation. A refusal to extend credit to a competitor of a bank's affil-
iate in order to eliminate that competitor from the market is arguably
79 Cf. Note, Bank Charter, Branching, Holding Company and Merger Laws: Competi-
tion Frustrated, 71 YALE L.J. 502, 504 (1962).
80 See STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
81 H.R. 9385, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
82 Id. § 2(4)(b).
83 Both H.R. 946, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), and H.R. 6778, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969),
retain the language of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-9
(Supp. IV, 1969), amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-8 (1964), which permits investment in cor-




a violation of both section 184 and section 285 of the Sherman Act. The
fact that the combination or conspiracy is between commonly owned
corporations would not prevent the application of the antitrust laws.86
With respect to the possibility of tying agreements, if there could
ever have been any doubt that such arrangements were unlawful, 87 the
doubts have been laid to rest by the recently decided case of Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,8 a private treble damage
action brought under the Sherman Act. The gravamen of plaintiff's
complaint was that in order for it to obtain loans totaling more than
$2 million from a wholly owned subsidiary of United States Steel, the
proceeds of which were to be used for the purchase and development
of real estate, it had to agree to erect on each of the lots so purchased
a prefabricated house manufactured by United States Steel. Plaintiff
intended to erect prefabricated houses on these lots but was not espe-
cially pleased with being forced to use United States Steel's products
since they cost more than $400 over the price of competing manu-
facturers' prefabricated houses.
The Court found no difficulty in recognizing that the challenged
conduct involved a traditional tying arrangement in which the plain-
tiff was required to accept a tied product (prefabricated houses) as a
condition of being allowed to purchase the tying product (credit). The
Court vigorously dismissed the defendant's argument that credit was
not a product which could be utilized for tying:
[W]e can find no basis for treating credit differently in prin-
ciple from other goods and services. . . . [T]ie-ins involving
credit can cause all of the evils that the antitrust laws have
always been intended to prevent, crippling other companies
that are equally if not more efficient in producing their own
products. Therefore, the same inquiries must be made as to
economic power over the tying product and substantial ef-
84 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
85 "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
86 See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
87 Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 618 (1941). General Motors' subsidiary, General Motors Acceptance Corporation,
was engaged in the financing of automobiles at both the wholesale and retail level.
General Motors was found guilty of conspiring to restrain the financing of its auto-
mobiles by using its monopoly power as a manufacturer to force its dealers to use the
services of General Motors Acceptance Corporation.
88 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
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tect in the tied product market, but where these factors are
present no special treatment can be justified solely because
credit, rather than some other product, is the source of the
tying leverage used to restrain competition. 9
In view of the existing laws and the climate of their strict enforce-
ment,90 it seems almost impossible to justify restricting the activities in
which one-bank holding companies may engage on the basis of a fear
that unrestricted activity will lead to anticompetitive behavior.
IV. BIG BANK, BAD BANK
The final argument advanced in opposition to one-bank holding
companies is that they would permit an undesirable concentration of
economic power. Thus, Representative Widnal, who introduced H.R.
9385, predicted that the trend toward one-bank holding companies
would result in "a fundamental restructuring of our economy, from
one in which economic and financial power is widely dispersed, into a
structure dominated by some 50 or 75 huge centers of economic
power." 91
The specter of the giant corporation appears to throw as much fear
into the hearts of 20th-century man as the Four Horsemen of the Apoc-
alypse did to the medieval Europeans, 92 and perhaps with equal justi-
fication. Court cases are replete with warnings of the evils of bigness
and the desirability of preserving the small firm. Thus, in United
States v. Swift & Co.,93 Mr. Justice Cardozo warned that "size carries
with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored." 94 In United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America,95 Judge Learned Hand noted
89 Id. at 509.
90 Current periodicals have noted that the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division
appears to be engaged in a crackdown on conglomerates. See, e.g., BusiN.SS WEK, June
21, 1969, at 120.
91 115 CoNG. Rac. H2012 (daily ed. March 24, 1969).
92 United States Attorney General John Mitchell has pledged a vigorous offensive
against what he refers to as "super-concentration'--the increasingly larger share of United
States business that is being done by a relatively small number of firms. He has warned
that this super-concentration poses dangers "to our economic, political and social struc-
ture [which] cannot be overestimated." Address before the Georgia Bar Ass'n, June 6,
1969, in Wall Street Journal, June 9, 1969, at 5, col. 1. Congressman Emanuel Celler
(D.-N.Y.), Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and the Committee's antitrust
subcommittee, has suggested the need for a new law limiting the asset size of corporations
to some designated amount regardless of anticompetitive effects. Address before the
American Management Ass'n, June 12, "1969, in Wall Street Journal, June 13, 1969, at
2, col. 3.
93 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
94 Id. at 116.
95 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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that throughout the history of the antitrust laws "it has been constant-
ly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve,
for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of indus-
try in small units." 96 Finally, there is Mr. Justice Douglas' impassioned
dissent in United States v. Columbia Steel Co.: 97
[All power tends to develop into a government in itself.
Power that controls the economy should be in the hands of
elected representatives of the people, not in the hands of an
industrial oligarchy. Industrial power should be decentralized.
It should be scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of
the people will not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the
political prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-ap-
pointed men. The fact that they are not vicious men but re-
spectable and social-minded is irrelevant. That is the philo-
sophy and command of the Sherman Act. It is founded on the
theory of hostility to the concentration in private hands of
power so great that only a government of the people should
have it.98
The fear of bigness is not limited to the field of banking; all con-
glomerate mergers are suspect. To some extent, the desire to avoid
economic concentration has judicially manifested itself in more ways
than mere warnings.9 9 In fact, some commentators see a clear trend
toward the judicial condemnation of any conglomerate merger prin-
cipally on the basis of the merging firm's size. 00
There is, of course, an opposing point of view. During the recent
congressional hearing on economic concentration, 101 for example, one
economist testified that "absolute size is absolutely irrelevant."'102 Pro-
fessor Galbraith believes that a great deal of this country's growth and
progress is due to the efforts and capabilities of the giant corpor-
ations.103
98 Id. at 429.
97 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
98 Id. at 536.
99 See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). Defendant was a large
diversified manufacturer of household products with annual sales in excess of $1 billion.
Defendant's acquisition of the leading manufacturer of liquid bleach (Clorox) was held
to violate § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), primarily because of the in-
creased concentration in the bleach industry which would result if the acquisition were
permitted.
100 See, e.g., Rill, Conglomerate Mergers: The Problem of "Superconcentration," 14
U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 1028, 1036 (1967).
101 Hearings on Economic Concentration Before Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th & 89th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pts. 1-5 (1964-66).
102 Id. at 228.
103 J.K. GAxLBRArm, TnE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
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Even if one accepts the position that economic concentration is un-
desirable per se, it does not follow that permitting one-bank holding
companies to enter nonbanking areas will lead to such concentration.
It is beyond doubt that a one-bank holding company is subject to the
antitrust laws. 04 Expansion through the holding company structure
is thus subject to the same scrutiny as would be the case in any other
type of corporate acquisition. Furthermore, even supporters of restric-
tive legislation would permit the bank holding company to enter areas
closely related to banking or finance. 10 5 Entry into such areas could
produce the same type of concentration as entry into other areas; thus,
in the final analysis, reliance is still placed upon the antitrust laws.
V. SOME PROBLEMS IN NEED OF SOLUTION
There appears to be no significant objection to the formation of
one-bank holding companies as such; the major controversy concerns
the type of activities in which the holding companies will be per-
mitted to engage.106 This seems quite peculiar since it would appear
that the major source of difficulty lies with the holding company
structure and not with the particular areas of business in which the
holding company might seek entry.
The factor which is most responsible for the existence of such diffi-
culty is the presence of an enormous amount of assets which banks
hold in their fiduciary capacity as corporate trustees for personal trusts
and employee pension funds. Commercial banks hold more than
$250 billion of assets in their trust departments, more than insurance
companies and mutual funds combined.10 7 To a large extent, the in-
struments which create these fiduciary accounts give the banks vir-
tually unlimited discretion to invest the assets.'08
Although some commentators have suggested that banks, like other
corporate trustees, have established reputations for honesty and reli-
104 On June 12, 1969, the Justice Department threatened to file suit to prevent the
acquisition of Chubb Corporation (an insurance concern with several subsidiary insur-
ance corporations) by First National City Corporation, a one-bank holding company
formed by First National City Bank of New York. While Chubb wanted to fight, First
National City surrendered. Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1969, at 2, col. 3.
105 See notes 82-84 and accompanying text supra.
106 See, e.g., statement of Charles Walker, Undersecretary of the Treasury, before the
House Committee on Banking and Currency, reported in BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP., No. 406, April 22, 1969, at AA-1.
107 See STAFF OF SUBCOMMa. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE OF THE HOUSE CoMM. ON BANKING
AND CURRENCY, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THEIR TRUST ACTIVITIES:
EMERGING INFLUENCE ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY Vol. 2, at 19 (Subcomm. Print 1968).
108 Compare D. BAUM & N. STILEs, THE SILENT PARTNERS 50 (1965) with PREsIDENT'S
COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE RETIREMENT AND WELFARE
PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS 75 (1965).
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ability and will therefore exercise self-discipline in order to maintain
their reputation, 0 9 the fear of possible abuses is aroused by the many
reported decisions in which banks have demonstrated their willingness
to engage in self-dealing at the expense of those to whom they owe
fiduciary obligations. 110
A. Management Self-Perpetuation
Before the popularity of the one-bank holding company structure
was evident, it became clear that the trust departments of many state
banks were undertaking a policy of purchasing their own bank stock
on behalf of their fiduciary accounts."' If a bank's stock were widely
held, a controlling interest in a bank could be achieved in this way
by purchasing considerably less than 51 per cent of the outstanding
shares."12 Having gained control of a bank, the bank's directors would
be in a position to perpetuate themselves in office by causing the stock
held in the fiduciary accounts to be voted for their reelection at each
annual meeting.
Management self-perpetuation through this technique is clearly
undesirable for a number of reasons. First, the managers are using
other persons' funds for their own self-interest, thereby violating one
of the cardinal tenets of fiduciary fidelity." 3 Second, unlike proxy
solicitations under section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,114
no disclosure to anyone need be made about anything. Thirdly, at-
tempts to oust the incumbent management slate are likely to prove
futile regardless of whether the technique employed is a proxy solici-
109 See, e.g., Comment, Cleveland Trust Co. v. Eaton: Can a Corporate Trustee Vote
Its Own Shares Held in Trust?, 54 VA. L. ,Ev. 327, 337 (1968).
110 See, e.g., Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 704 (D. Colo.
1966); Pennsylvania Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 40 Del. Ch. 567, 186 A.2d 751 (Ct.
Chanc. 1962); In re Ferris, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 428, 182 N.E.2d 78 (C.P. 1962).
111 "Over 93% of the banks surveyed hold some shares in their own bank. Over 56%
hold 5% or more of their own shares. Just under 30% hold more than 10% of their own
shares. Seven banks, all major commercial banks in their communities, hold more than
one-third of their own shares." STAF OF SUBCOMM. ON Do MaSic FNANCE oF THE HousE
CoMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON BANK STOCK OWNER-
SHIP AND CONTROL 1 (Subcomm. Print 1966).
112 Cf. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485 (1967).
113 Courts have generally prohibited any self-dealing by a trustee that could harm the
beneficiaries, even where no actual harm is shown. See Scott, The Trustee's Duty of
Loyalty, 49 HARv. L. Rzv. 521, 564-5 (1936). A state bank's purchase of its own stock on
behalf of its trust accounts was held to be a breach of fiduciary duty in Cleveland Trust
Co. v. Eaton, 40 Ohio Op. 2d 460, 229 N.E.2d 850 (C.P. 1967) (alternate holding), but an
opposite result was reached in Graves v. Security Trust Co., 369 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. 1963).
State law is generally silent on the question of whether banks may vote their own shares
held in trust. Note, The Corporate Fiduciary's Power to Vote Its Own Stock, 68 COLUM.
L. REv. 116 (1968); Comment, supra note 109.
114 15 U.S.C. § 78n (Supp. IV, 1969).
1969]
The University of Chicago Law Review
tation or tender offer, since management can be expected vigorously
and consistently to resist such efforts by refusing to vote any of the
stock held in fiduciary accounts in favor of the ouster.
The undesirability of management self-perpetuation in this fashion
accounts for the fact that national banks are generally prohibited
from engaging in this tactic:
[I]n the election of directors, shares of its own stock held by
a national bank as sole trustee, whether registered in its own
name as such trustee or in the name of its nominee, shall
not be voted by the registered owner unless under the terms
of trust the manner in which such shares shall be voted may
be determined by a donor or beneficiary of the trust and
unless such donor or beneficiary actually directs how such
shares shall be voted.... 115
It is self-evident that nothing in the above statute would prohibit
a national bank from purchasing for its trust accounts the shares of its
parent corporation (i.e., the holding company). That being the case,
management self-perpetuation can be accomplished as readily as the
state banks were (are?) managing to do it. In other words, the very
existence of a one-bank holding company permits this salutary statute
to be circumvented, even if the holding company makes no acquisitions
at all.
Fortunately, the Comptroller of the Currency1 6 is not entirely help-
less, for he has prescribed that
*. . funds held by a national bank as fiduciary shall not be
invested by the purchase of stock or obligations of the bank
or its affiliates unless authorized by the instrument creating
the relationship or by court order or by local law." 7
Unfortunately, the Comptroller has managed to say both too little
and too much in his regulation. He has said too little because he has
failed to define the term "affiliates." Is a one-bank holding company
an affiliate of its subsidiary bank? An affirmative answer is required,
and such an answer can be based upon any of three sources. First,
the Comptroller can issue an ex cathedra pronouncement that the
term "affiliates" will be interpreted to include the one-bank holding
company parent of a bank subsidiary (after all, it is his regulation,
115 12 U.S.C. § 61 (Supp. IV, 1969).
116 The Comptroller of the Currency is the chief officer of the administrative agency
having general regulatory and supervisory power over national banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp.
IV, 1969).
117 12 C.F.R. § 9.12(c) (1969) (self-dealing).
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isn't it?). Secondly, the Comptroller may rely by analogy upon the
language of his regulation section 9.12(a) which prohibits investments
by banks in an "organization in which there exists such an interest as
might affect the exercise of the best judgment of the bank .. ,"118
Thirdly, the Comptroller may rely upon the definition of affiliates
used in the Federal Reserve Act which includes any corporation that
"owns or controls, directly or indirectly, either a majority of the shares
of capital stock of a... bank or more than 50 per centum of the num-
ber of shares voted for the election of directors .... ll
The Comptroller's regulation says too much for two reasons. First,
the regulation permits investment of trust funds in affiliates if the trust
instrument so provides. This creates the risk that every national bank
in the country which has a trust department will adopt a standard
trust form giving the banks this investment power. Persons establishing
fiduciary accounts may not realize the significance of granting such
power, or they may not care if the bank is granted such a power.
To the extent that management self-perpetuation is detrimental to
the shareholders of one-bank holding companies, persons establishing
fiduciary accounts should not be given the opportunity to grant such
investment powers.
The second way in which the regulation says too much is by permit-
ting investments in bank affiliates if local law so provides. This part of
the regulation was probably designed to insure the competitive equal-
ity of national banks vis4-vis state banks.120 Considering the almost
unlimited range of investment opportunities open to national banks
it would not appear very likely that a national bank would lose trust
accounts to state banks if this "local law" provision were eliminated.
Apart from the Comptroller's regulation discussed above, investment
of trust funds in a bank's parent holding company can probably be
eliminated by judicious utilization of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation's supervisory powers. The FDIC insures a bank's trust ac-
counts in much the same way it insures the accounts of other bank
depositors.1 2 1 Using its powers to terminate the insured status of a
bank engaged in "unsafe or unsound" practices, 2 2 the FDIC can
regulate this aspect of one-bank holding companies.
118 12 C.F.R. § 9.12(a) (1969) (self-dealing).
"19 12 U.S.C. § 221a(4) (Supp. IV, 1969).
120 Compare First Natl Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252
(1966) with Dickinson v. First Nat'l Bank in Plant City, 400 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. granted, 394 U.S. 996 (1969).
121 12 U.S.C. § 1817(i) (Supp. IV, 1969).
122 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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B. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
If a firm expands internally, it is quite difficult to argue that a
reduction in competition has occurred, for obviously a new firm has
entered the market. On the other hand, if a corporation enters the
market by acquiring a firm already there, there is at least a basis for
asserting that the acquisition could have anticompetitive consequences.
For example, it may be alleged that the acquiring firm would have
entered the market by internal expansion if it had not acquired the
existing firm.123 Or it may be alleged that the acquiring and acquired
firms will engage in reciprocal buying arrangements to the detriment
of other competitors of the acquired firm.124
To the extent that such arguments are sound,1 25 a policy which
enhances the ability of one firm to acquire another is less desirable
than one which does not. The one-bank holding company structure
combined with a bank's fiduciary accounts falls into the less desirable
category because of a rather serious shortcoming in the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.126
Most corporations desiring to acquire another firm by first obtaining
a large segment of the stock of the desired firm must face section 16(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act,1 27 which in general provides for the
123 See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). See also
Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations of the Anti-
Merger Act, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1231, 1241-9 (1968).
124 See, e.g., United States v. International Tel. and Tel. Corp., Civil No. 69 C 924
(N.D. Ill., filed April 28, 1969), where the gravamen of the Justice Department's com-
plaint which seeks to enjoin the acquisition of Canteen Corporation by ITT is that "The
power of ITT and Canteen to employ reciprocity or benefit from reciprocity in the
furnishing of vending and in-plant feeding services will be substantially increased."
125 Both propositions axe open to very serious doubt as to their economic validity. If
a firm decides to expand into a new market (either product or geographic), the decision
must be based upon the firm's prediction that such an expansion will yield a rate of
return on invested capital sufficiently great to warrant the expenditure of funds for that
purpose as opposed to investing the funds elsewhere. There is no reason to assume that
the costs of expansion through acquisition will approximately equal the cost of expansion
through internal growth. It may be that the only satisfactory rate of return is achieved
by expansion through acquisition. Consequently, the fact that a firm seeks to expand
through acquisition does not necessarily mean that it would be willing to expand through
internal growth if it were precluded from employing the first alternative. With respect
to reciprocity, unless the firm's managers act irrationally-a position which economic
analysis assumes is never the case-a firm will buy products from its affiliates only as
long as such products cost no more than competing products produced elsewhere. Other
firms selling in the affiliates' market are still able to compete for the business of the
acquiring firm.
126 15 U.S.C. § 78n (Supp. IV, 1969).
127 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964) provides:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than
10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted secu-
rity) which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or who is a director
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giving of public notice by any person beneficially owning more than
10 per cent of a corporation's stock. Such public notice will alert the
target corporation which may then begin employment of various de-
vices to avoid a takeover. 128 The bank holding company, on the other
hand, may acquire through the trust department of its bank subsidiary
as much stock of the target corporation as it deems necessary without
complying with the section 16(a) disclosure requirements, as long as no
single trust account owns more than 10 per cent of the stock of the
target corporation. This occurs because the statute speaks in terms of
beneficial ownership rather than legal ownership.
The holding company may also ignore with impunity the "short
swing" profits provisions of section 16(b), 129 again because of the use of
the concept of beneficial ownership. Even without a holding company,
a bank is free to obtain "short swing" profits in flagrant violation
of the spirit but not the letter of the Securities Exchange Act.
Why does the Securities Exchange Act employ the beneficial owner-
ship concept? The answer is that without it a large stockholder could
transfer his stock to a trust and thereby escape the requirements of
the Act. On the other hand, the rise of large corporate trustees now
warrants a change in the wording of the Act so that section 16 would
or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registra-
tion of such security on a national securities exchange or by the effective date
of a registration statement fied pursuant to section 781(g) of this title, or within
ten days after he becomes such beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement
with the Commission (and if such security is registered on a national securities
exchange, also with the exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of such
issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of
each calendar month thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership
during such month, shall file with the Commission (and if such security is regis-
tered on a national securities exchange, shall also file with the exchange), a
statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such
changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month.
128 "Tender offers are frequently arranged in secret in hopes of catching the target
management unprepared to respond effectively." Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by
Incumbent Managements in Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1104, 1106 (1969).
This note provides a useful collection and analysis of the various methods which may
be employed by corporate managers to thwart potential takeover efforts.
129 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his rela-
tionship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale,
or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an
exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such security
was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the
part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such trans-
action of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold
for a period exceeding six months .... This subsection shall not be construed
to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the
time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved,
or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations
may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
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include any corporate trustee controlling 10 per cent or more of any
non-exempt security required by the Act to be registered.
It seems fairly clear that there is one tactic which not even banks
could get away with. To make a desired acquisition, a one-bank hold-
ing company might be tempted to order its bank subsidiary to sell
the t pt cororntion's stndrk (nsuming nf rnii.rs. that the bank's
trust department owns a substantial quantity of such stock), in an effort
to drive down the market price, causing other stockholders to panic
and either sell their shares or to look with favor upon a takeover bid
put forth by the holding company.
Such a tactic would be a violation of section 9(a)(2) of the Securities
Exchange Act which makes it illegal for any person:
To effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series
of transactions in any security registered on a national secu-
rities exchange creating actual or apparent active trading in
such security or raising or depressing the price of such secu-
rity, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such
security by others.130
Considering the recent revelation that bank trust departments do in
fact own large percentages of the stock of major corporations,' 3 ' the
existence of this provision should provide considerable protection
against any possible abusive practices that could be engendered by an
acquisition-oriented one-bank holding company.
C. The Clayton Act
The acquisition of control by one corporation engaged in commerce
of another corporation also engaged in commerce is often challenged
under section 7 of the Clayton Act.132 There has never been a reported
case in which a bank's acquisition, on behalf of its trust accounts, of
the stock of two or more firms arguably competing with one another
in some line of commerce has ever been challenged under this law.
The lack of litigation is perhaps due to the secrecy which shrouds
trust department activities, making it difficult or impossible for an
130 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1964) (emphasis supplied).
131 See STAFF REPORT OF SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE OF THE HOUSE CoMrM. ON
BANKING AND CURRENCY, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THEIR TRuST Acriv-
rTiEs: EMERGING INFLUENCE ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, vol. 2, at 19 (Subcomm. Print
1968).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964) provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or
any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly.
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enforcement agency to learn of possible violations. Or perhaps the
banks were able to satisfy the "solely for investment" exemption 33
and thereby avoid the prohibitions of the Clayton Act altogether.
The presence of one-bank holding companies makes this situation
ripe for change. If a one-bank holding company acquires a subsidiary
engaged in commerce while at the same time it holds indirectly, through
its bank subsidiary, stock of another corporation also engaged in the
same line of commerce, the acquisition can surely be challenged if
"the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly."' 34 To make enforcement mean-
ingful, the holding company must be required to disclose the aggregate
percentage of stock held in the trust department of its bank subsidiary.
Such disclosure could be made by periodic reports, a requirement
which is incorporated in one of the current legislative proposals deal-
ing with one-bank holding companies. 135
D. Monetary Policy
One final problem that arises from the existence of the one-bank
holding company structure is that it permits the banks to circumvent
the Federal Reserve's monetary policy decisions. The Federal Reserve
is authorized to establish maximum rates of interest which may be
paid by member banks upon time deposits. 136 If the Federal Reserve
wishes to engage in a restrictive monetary policy to combat inflation,
it sets a rate which is low relative to other interest-bearing investments.
With low interest ceilings, banks find it difficult to attract time de-
posits which serve as the basis for their loans.137 Banks are effectively
restrained by Federal Reserve regulation from selling commercial paper
in order to raise additional funds. 138 A bank holding company, however,
133 "This section shall not apply to corporations purchasing such stock solely for in-
vestment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting
to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
134 Id.
135 H.R. 6778, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969), introduced by Congressman Wright Patman
(D-Tex.), Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, contains the
following amendment to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act: "Any insured
bank which holds any securities in a fiduciary capacity at the end of any calendar quarter
shall, not later than thirty days thereafter, file a statement with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission setting forth the descriptions and amounts of the securities so held."
Id. § I().
136 12 C.F.R. § 217.3 (1969). Since 1936, maximum rates that may be paid by banks
insured by the FDIC but not members of the Federal Reserve System have been the
same as those established by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
137 See BusINsS W c.a, April 5, 1969, at 98.
138 With certain specified exceptions, any promissory note issued by a member bank
principally as a means of obtaining funds to be used in its banking business is defined by
Federal Reserve Regulation Q as a "deposit." 12 C.F.R. § 217.1(f) (1969). Bank-issued
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is not so restricted.13 9 The holding company may sell its own commercial
paper at whatever interest rate supply and demand in the money market
establishes, an interest rate which undoubtedly would be higher than
banks could pay on time deposits.
The proceeds from the holding company's sale of commercial paper
may then be used to purchase loans from its subsidiary bank. The
bank in turn could use the money so acquired to make additional
loans much to the chagrin of the Federal Reserve. This practice is
already in operation in a few one-bank holding companies.140
If the one-bank holding companies were permitted to enter any
business area they desired, then circumvention of the Federal Re-
serve's monetary policy would probably not occur to any significant
extent. The reason is that the holding company was formed in order
to permit investment in areas yielding a higher rate of return than
can be obtained by lending the funds. It would be defeating the very
purpose of establishing a holding company if it were used merely to
obtain additional loanable funds for the bank.
CONCLUSION
The reasons for opposition to one-bank holding companies are as
varied as the groups advancing them. Some persons fear size as such.
Others have lived through the Great Depression and fear banks as such.
Still others seek to avoid competing with banks which may turn out
to be more efficient than they are. Then there are those who fear
takeover attempts and see bank holding companies as an additional
source of takeover potential. Many persons believe that one-bank
holding companies would erode well-established principles designed
to enhance depositor safety or would lead to a lessening of competition.
But all of these fears and beliefs are held together by a common
factor: they lack both historical and theoretical support. To be sure,
the one-bank holding company structure may pose some problems
commercial paper would consequently be subject to the limitation on interest imposed
by Regulation Q. At present, the maximum interest which may be paid is 614% per
annum for a single maturity time deposit of $100,000 or more. 12 C.F.R. § 217.6(a) (1969).
It is not likely that a bank would be able to sell its commercial paper in a money market
yielding substantially higher rates of return for alternative forms of investment. Thus,
by maintaining an interest ceiling lower than the existing rates in the money market,
the Federal Reserve can effectively prohibit banks from issuing commercial paper.
139 The Federal Reserve Board has indicated that it is considering imposing a reserve
requirement on the commercial paper issued by one-bank holding companies although
the legality of such action is admittedly uncertain. Wall Street Journal, July 1, 1969, at
2, col. 3.
140 The volume of commercial paper issued by one-bank holding companies is believed
to be considerably less than $1 billion. Wall Street Journal, July 1, 1969, at 2, col. 3.
See also BUSINESS WrEK, April 5, 1969, at 98.
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that need to be corrected through legislative action. But arguments
over what activities the holding companies should be permitted to
engage in; arguments over which agency should make the decision;
and arguments as to how far back proposed "grandfather clauses"
should go, all appear quite inappropriate to the consideration of the
real problems engendered by or exacerbated through the existence
of one-bank holding companies.
